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Novation-Statuteof Frauds.
Where G owes C, and M owes G, C demands payment of G. G
gives him an order on M4. C agrees to release G provided M4 accepts
order. Mf accepts order and pays $45 thereon, and promises to pay
balance at future time. M4 is released as G's debtor and becomes the
debtor of C. M thereby accepts C as his creditor in place of G.
M, at request of G, agrees to pay to C money that he owes by contract to G. Such contract is not within the Statute of Frauds, requiring
the promise to pay the debt of another to be'in-writing. M4 simply pays
his own debt to a different person than the one he originally agreed to
pay it to. He is paying his own debt, not the debt of another.
SYLLABUS

BY THE COURT.

OPINION.
SULLIVAN, J. Miller was owing Gates, Gates was
owing Casey, and Miller simply agreed to pay the sum
of $315 due from him to Gates, to Casey, or, in other
words, he had agreed tQ accept Casey as his creditor
instead of Gates.
Miller did not, under said agreement, agree to pay the "debt of another," within the
meaning of that term as used in the Statute of Frauds,
but simply agreed to pay the debt owing by himself
to appellant instead of to Gates. In Barringer v. Warden,' the Court, in referring to the Statute of Frauds, said
" that the statute requires the prothise to pay the debt of
another to be in writing expressing the consideration; but
this requirement has no reference to the promise by A to.
pay money that he owes by contract with B, to C. This
is his debt, and the mere direction in which he pays it
does not alter the character of the contract from the
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original obligation. There is no difference between a
debtor promising to pay his creditor directly so much
money which he owes him, or promising his creditor to
pay a third person the same sum, by an agreement between
the three. The promisor is paying his own debt and his
own obligation, and not assuming another's.

.

.

So, in

the case at bar, Gates consented to such arrangement and
gave Casey an order on the respondent. Casey assented to
the arrangement by accepting the order; Miller assented
by agreeing to pay the order."
WHAT PROMISES TO PAY THE DEBT OF ANOTHER ARE WITHIN THE
STATUTE OF FRAUDS.

This recent case is a welcome
one in its field, for by its clear
language it helps to lessen the confusion which some less deliberate
opinions in the long line of decisions on this subject have occasioned: The cases which have
turned on the question whether a
man is paying his own debt or
another's are numerous, the decisions often conflicting, and the
grounds on which the same conclusions are based, various.
"The answer to the question
is
usually found by applying a test to
the circumstances of each particu.
lar case. But, unfortunately, the
authorities differ as to what that
test should be. Sometimes it is
the nature of the promise itself; if
the promisor derives actual benefit
from, or furthers his own interest
by his promise, notwithstanding
that he thereby discharges the
debt of a third person, the first
attribute prevails over the second,
and his is a promise to pay his own
debt, not within the Statute of
'Frauds, and need not bein writing.
In some cases the fact of the third
person continuing to be liable
after the promise is made is supposed to l-e -the proper criterion.
The existence of a consideration

received by the promisor, the nature of such consideration, and the
fact of its being expressed in writing, or not, are other examples of
what has influenced the courts.
The two classes of promises in
this connection are conveniently,
if not always accurately, distinguished by the terms " original"
and "collateral." The former is
thus defined by the Court in
Nugent v. Wolfe, Iii Pa., 480:
"When the leading object of the
promisor is to subserve some interest or purpose of his own, notwithstanding the effect is to pay or
discharge the debt of another, his
promise is not within the Statute
of Frauds" and need not be in'
writing.
" Collateral promises,
where the object of the promisor
is to become surety or guarantor
of another's debt, or to obtain the
release of the person or property
of the debtor, or other forbearance
or benefit to him, are within the
Statute of Frauds and not valid
unless in writing."
In the following cases the decisions appear to have been based
principally on the nature of the
promise itself.
Barringer v. Warden, 12 Cal.,
3i (IS59). A owed money by con-
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tract to B, and verbally promised
to pay it to C in consideration of
his release by B. The court held
that the Statute of Frauds has no
reference "to a promise by A to
pay money he owes by contract
with B to C. This is his debt; the
mere direction in which he pays it
not altering the character of the
contract from an original obligation. There is no difference between a debtor promising to pay
his creditor directly so much money
which he owes him, and promising
his creditor to pay a third person
the same sum by agreement between the three. The last promisor is paying his own debt, and
creating his own obligation, not
assuming another's."
Barker v.
Cornwall, 4 Cal., 16.
Barker v. Bucklin, 2 Denio, 45
(1846). Plaintiff held a bond of
one F. Defendant promised plaintiff, in consideration of his forbearing to sue F on his bond, that
defendant would pay to plaintiff a
sum of money which he owed F
for a pair of horses, such sum to be
in part satisfaction of the debt F
owed the plaintiff. Tbe court held
that this promise was not within
the Statute of Frauds as it was not
a promise to pay the debt of a
third person, but the payment of
the promisor's own debt to a person designated by the promisor's
creditor, who had, in fact, a right
to make such payment a part of
the contract of sale.
Runde v. Runde, 59 Ill., 98 (187).
A owed B and gave him his note
for amount exceeding the indebtedness, secured by mortgage worth
full amount of the note. A then
became indebted to C, but could
not pay. They all met together
and agreed, that, by virtue of the
claim A had on B for the difference
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between the actual debt and the
amount of the mortgage, B should
pay such difference to C in satisfaction for what A owed C. Held,
B's promise was an original undertaking to pay to C, not A's indebtedness to C, but his own indebtedness to A, and therefore not within
the Statute of Frauds (Darst v.
Bates, 95 Ill., 493).
McClaren v. Hutchinson, 22 Cal.,
187 (1863). A was indebted to B
for work done on A's farm. A sold
his farm to C who agreed with A
in writing to pay B what A owed
him. Then B agreed verbally with
C to release A from the debt and
look to C for payment; B sues C.,
The Court ruled that the case was
not within the Statute of Frauds.
A being indebted to B for work
done, and C being indebted to A for
purchase money, A and C mutually
agree that C shall pay A's debt and
this arrangement is assented to by
B. "Here is a mutual agreement
by the parties interested, and it
can make no difference that this
mutual agreement was not perfected at the same moment of time,
or that all were not present at the
time of its completion .......
B's assent to the agreement between A and C gave them a right
of action against the defendant."
Rowe v. Whittier, 21 Me., 549.
Robinson v. Gilman, 43 N. H.,
485 (1862). A was indebted to B on
promissory notes, C promised to B
that if B would not bring suit on
said notes and summon C as trustee of A, he would see that the
notes were paid. As C was answerable as trustee for a large
amount of.A's property, the Court
held that the debt he promised to
pay was also his own debt and
therefore not within the Statute.
Nugent v. Wolfe, iii Pa., 471
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(iS86). Bank had obtained judgment against Power & Co. Nugent
went security for Power & Co. for
stay of execution upon said payment, being induced to do so by
Wolfe, who verbally promised, in
consideration therefor, to indemnify and save him "harmless from
any, loss or liability, and from paying anything by reason of his so
going security."
judgment for
defendant. Appealed. Affirmhed.
"The only consideration for the
alleged agreement disclosed by
plaintiffs offer is the disadvantage
to him of the risk he incurred by
becoming bail for stay of execution
on the judgment against Powers &
Co. In consideration of the risk
or contingent liability thus assumed by plaintiff at defendant's
request, the latter promised and
agreed to pay the judgment, or see
that it was paid by Powers & Co.,
and thus save the plaintiff from
the necessity of paying the same.
...
. If it is not an agreement
to axswer for the debt or default
of Powers & Co., it would be difficult to say what it is. Their liability to the bank still remained.
The only consideration moving between the promisor and promisee,
as claimed by the latter, is the risk
he incurred in becoming bail for
Powers & Co. There is no testimony, nor was any offered, to show
that defendant had any personal
interest in the judgment on which
bail was entered, or that he held
property or funds that should have
been applied to the payment
thereof. So far as appears, it was
the proper debt of Powers & Co.,
and the substance of defetfdant's
agreement is, that he would see
that they paid it; and if they failed
to do so he would pay it for them.
It was literally a promise to answer
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for the default of Powers & Co.
Plaintiff's liability as bail for stay
was merely collateral to the debt
in judgment, and had in contemplation nothing but the payment
thereof to the bank The promise
of defendant is within the Statute,
and cannot be enforced because it is
not in writing :" Ware v. Morgan,
67 Ala., 467; Underwood v. Lovelace, 6i id., I55 ; Beal v. Ridgway,
i8 id., i17 ; Stryon v. Bell, 8 Jones
(N. C.), 225.
Brown v. Weber, 38 N. Y., 187
(1868). H had contracted in writing to build a mill for defendant,
on defendant's land. After the
frame had been erected, H contracted in writing with plaintiff
that plaintiff should complete the
building. Plaintiff began work but
soon told defendant that he was
afraid H could not pay him; defendant, by way of inducement,
then verbally promised that if plaintiff finished the mill according to
contract, he, defendant, would see
that plaintiff would get his pay
and lose nothing by it. Held,that
the receipt or non-receipt of a consideration by the promisor was not
always conclusive, and certainly
not in this case. The question waswhether the defendant made a contract with the plaintiff to finish the
mill, or whether he merely became
security that H should pay plaintiff
for his work. The latter view accords with the facts of the case,
and the promise not being an independent one, is void by the Statute
of Frauds. It might perhaps be
questioned if the defendant's interest in having the mill built on his
own land is not sufficient benefit or
advantage to himself to impart to
his promise the character of an
original promise: Read v. Nash,
I Wils., 355; Fish v. Hutchinson,
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2 Wils., 94; Simpson v. Patton, 4
Johns., 222; Shingerland v. Morse,
7 Johns. Rep., 463; Skelton v.
Brewster, 8 Johns., 576; Gold v.
Phillips, io id., 412; Meyers v.
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fore, as regarded A for his promise
was the benefit or advantage to himself arising from S's relinquishing
proceedings upon his mechanic's
lien. The consideration did not
Morse, 15 id., 425; OlmstQad v.
proceed from or to the debtor, but
Greenly, i8 id., 12.
was an entirely new or fresh one
In the following cases the courts
between A and S, and was a new
have looked more toward the con- and original binding contract, A's
sideration as a means of settling
object being not to answer for the
the question. They have pointed
debt of his vendee, but to subserve
out just how much or how little is a purpose of his own. We do not,
necessary to constitute a consider- therefore, think the Act of 26th
ation, which, when received by the April, 18;5, includes this case, and
promisor, will enable him to dis- if such a defence were available,
charge what is apparently a third it would only sanction what would
person's debt as if it were his own ; be a gross fraud on the part of the
that is, free from the statutory re- plaintiff in error."
quirements governing the payment
Ikin v. Timlin, 151 Penna., 491
of another's debt.
(1892).
Defendant had contracted
Arnold v. Stedman, 45 Penna.,
to sell his interest in land to plain188 (1863). A sold land reserving
tiff, and also the interest of a cothe right of entry for non-payment
tenant. Plaintiff objected to taking
of balance of purchase money on a
deed of the co-tenant for fear there
certain date. Before this date S
might be judgments against him.
filed a mechanic's lien for building
Defendant by way of inducement
a barn for the vendee. A brought
then promised to pay all of coejectment upon non-payment by
tenant's judgments. The Court
vendee, which resulted in giving
held that this was not a promise to
his vendee a year's more time in
pay the debt of another, but "an
which to pay the balance; while original undertaking to indemnify
this suit was in progress, A prom- based upon a sufficient consideraised S that he would pay him the tion."
That consideration was
mechanic's lien when the property
self-interest. Defendant "was, at
came back to him if S would stop
least, interested in effecting the
proceedings on the lien. They sale of Watt's (co-tenant's) interest
agreed to this. Upon non-payment
in the land because the sale of his
by the vendee when the time had own interest depended on that.
elapsed, A sold the land to other
Plaintiff had agreed to buy both
parties, and S sued. A for the interests, but not either without
amount of the lien. Judgment the other." In line with this is
for plaintiff. Appealed. Affirmed.
the case of Alger v. Scoville, i
IHere, then, was a lien or claim
Gray, 391.
upon property in which A had an
See also Malone v. Keener, 42
interest, and it was a benefit to him Penna., 85; Stout v. Hine, 43 id.,'
that no proceedings should take 30; Whitcomb v. Kephart, 5o .id.,
place on themechanic's lien held by
85; Townsend v. Long, 77 id., 143;
S while his ejectment was in pro- Fehlinger v. Wood, 134 id., 525,
gress. The consideration, there- where the promise was sustained;

NOVATION-STATUTE
and Allshouse v. Ramsey, 6 Whart.,
331; Shoemaker v. King, 40 Pa.,
107; Miller v. Long, 45 id., 350,
-where the promise was held to be
void.
Emerson v. Slater, i Pet., 28
(1859). The plaintiff, a contractor,
was under contract with a railroad
company to build its road. Work
ceased when company's credit was
shaken. A stockholder of the company, the defendant, entered into
a written contract with the contractor, that if the latter would pay
him one dollar and complete the
work as originally planned, he, the
defendant, would pay him in cash
and notes, the notes to be applied
to the indebtedness of the railroad
company to the plaintiff, and the

agreement in no way to affect any
contract of the plaintiff with the
railroad. "Prior to the date," of
the defendant's contract with plaintiff, "the railroad company had
failed and was utterly insolvent,
owning nothing, it seems, except
the securities transferred to the defendant for his indemnity in this
transaction, and the franchise of
the road. Unlike what was exhibited in the former record, it now
appears that the defendant had
large interests of his own, separate
from his relation to the company
as a stockholder, which were to be
promoted by the arrangement. He
had loaned to the company railroad
iron for the use of the road amounting in value to the sum of $68,ooo,
and, as a security for payment, held
an assignment of the proceeds of
the road to that amount with
interest, which was to be paid in
monthly instalments of $5ooo.
Now, unless the bridges were
completed and the road put in a
condition for use, there would be
no proceeds; and as he had already
takeii into his possession all the
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available means of the company to
secure himself for thisnew liability,
should the road not be completed,
the company could not pay for the
iron. In this view of the subject it

is manifest that the arrangement
was mainly to promote the individual interest of the defendant.
We think itis clear that the promise
of the defendant was an original
undertaking upon a good and valid
consideration moving between the
parties to the written agreement."
Anderson v. Davis, 9 Vt., 136

(1837). B, a builder, contracted
with A, the defendant, to erect a
building; afterward B engaged C
as his partner and both worked
until B fell ill, and worked ceased.
A then promised C to pay him for
his work already done and what he
should afterward do. C sues A for
both sums on the verbal promise.
"There was no original privity between A and C. A employed B
and B employed C. To B alone
could C look for his labor up to the
time of the defendant's promise to
the plaintiff. ....
.If
A became
holden to C for this claim against
B as collateral to B, and the claim
still remained against B it (the
promise) was within the statute.
But if A was to assume the debt,
and he alone be holden, and B to
be discharged then the contract
was not collateral, but independant,
and not within the statute and required no note in writing, nor special action therefor .....
Assuming that the contract was that C
was to have no further claim on B,
and that this was what constituted
the consideration for A's promise
together with C's continuing his
work, this brings us to another

point in the case."

(Judgment for

defendant reversing court below on
a point of evidence.)
Nelson v. Boynton, 3 Metc., 396
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A son promised that in
consideration that the holder of a
promissory note of his father would
not sue upon it, to pay it himself.
The Court held that this was not
an original, but a collateral promise,
for its principal object was not to
benefit the son but the father.
"Forbearance to sue is a good consideration forawritten promise, but
not such a consideration that would
make the promisean original undertaking. "This is a collateral promise to pay the debt of another and
void because not in writing. In the
mind of the Court, then, the filial
interest of a son in preserving his
father's credit and saving the family
name and honor from the risk of
suffering reproach in a public
court-room is not such a 'selfinterest' as will support his promise to pay his father's just debts."
This case is approied and followed
in Westheimer v. Peacock, 2 Iowa,
528.
Chandler v. Davidson, 6 Blackf.,
Ind., 367 (1843). A-widow verbally
promised to pay a debt owing to
plaintiff by her late husband. "It
is said, however, that considering
her as being possessed of the goods
under the will, she was under a
moral obligation to pay the debts
of the estate to the value of the
goods, and that such obligation
was a sufficient consideration for
the express promise sued upon....
The promise was to pay, not the
promisor's own debt, but a debt
due by her deceased husband, and
such apromise tobethe foundation
of.a suit, must be in writing, by the
Statute of Frauds unless the consideration be sufficient to give to
the promise the character of an
There
original undertaking. ....
are cases, however, in which a new
consideration passes at the time of
(1341).
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the promise between the newly
contracting parties of such a character, that it would support a
promise to the plaintiff for the
payment of the same sum of money
without reference to any debt of
But it is evident
another.......
that the moral obligation relied on
in this case was not a consideration
of that description."
Bumford v. Purcell, 4 Green,
Iowa, 488 (I884). "B as principal
and P as security signed a note to
D for town lots purchased by B.
Before the notes matured, B proposed orally that he would relinquish the lots to P if P would pay
the note and save B harmless. B
soon after left the State. After
judgment was obtained against P
on the note he paid the same; and
subsequently in a suit against B for
the amount, B proposed to prove
by parol the agreement under which
P was to pay the note, and B relinquished to him the lots." Held,
parol agreement void. Judgment
for plaintiff. Appealed. Affirmed.
"P was legally liable as surety to
pay the note to the holder, but that
liability did not exist between P
and B. No consideration or agreement in writing had passed between
them. B agreed to relinquish his
right to the lots, but did not do so.
A promise to release is not a relinquishment. A promise to pay is
not a payment. Even an agreement
in writing to answer for the debt of
another has been held to be void if
no consideration move between the
plaintiff and defendant, either of
forbearance or otherwise. Elliot z).
Giese, 7 Har. & J., 458; Leonard v.
Vrendenbugh, 8 Johns., 29; Bailey
v. Freeman, 4Johns., 28o; Tainney
v.Prince, 4 Pick., 385.
The bill of exceptions shows that
the parties agreed to make an agree-
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ment, but the agreement was not
closed. Consequently the relation
between the parties was not
changed. If the promise in this
case had been complete and absolute and founded upon an actual
legal transfer of the lots to P in
writing, that transfer coupled with
P's liability to pay the note as
security or indorser, would remove
the case from the statute. In Spann
v. Baltzell, i Branch, 281, it is
.decided that an absolute promise
by an indorser of a note founded
on a new and valuable consideration to paythe amount of such note
to the holder, is not within the
Statute of Frauds. . . . As the
bill of exceptions shows that the
defendant in this case did not propose to prove a-i absolute promise
to pay the note *founded on a new
and valuable - onsideration, the
Court very properly refused to
admit parol proo of such promise:"
Eddy v..Robeits, 17 Ill., 505.
Westheimer v. Peacock, 2 Iowa,
,528 (1856). Peacock, Jr., had executed his promissory note and did
not pay at maturity, whereupon
the payees informed Peacock, Jr.'s,
father that they would sue his son
and attach the property. Father
Peacock said he would pay the note
if they would forbear to sue, and
this was orally agreed to. Payees
then assigned the note to plaintiff,
who, relying on the verbal promise,
brought suit against father Peacock. Verdict for plaintiff. Appealed. Reversed.
"We think
this is nothing more than one of
those cases when A becomes the
surety for the debt of B in consider.ation that the creditor will forbear
to sue or to prosecute a suit already
commenced. The agreement to
forbear might be a good consideration to support the promise if in
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writing, but not a consideration or
such a character as to make a new
and opiginal transaction between
the parties. There is nothing to
show that the defendant, when he
made the promise, had in view or
secured a benefit which accrued
immediately to himself. On the
contrary, his object was to obtain
forbearance or benefit to his son.
If for his own benefit the promise
would not be within the statute; if
for the debtor, it would. And this
distinction we think importand and.
clearly recognized by the authorities."
The language of Barker v. BuckUn, 2 Denio, 45, may imply that
forbearance to sue is a consideration sufficient to uphold a promise
of a third person. "An agreement
on the part of a creditor to forbear
to sue a debtor is a good consideration to uphold a promise of a third
person to pay the debt." This case
also lays down the rule that 'to
constitute a valid agreement to pay
the debt of another, therefore, there
must be not only a good consideration, but the agreement must be in
writing and must express the consideration. Both ingredients must
concur or the agreement will be
void."
Blunt v. Boyd, 3 Barb., 209 (1848).
A was indebted to B for lumber
amounting to $87. . C was indebted
to A for work done. C agreed wit
A to pay the $87 to B, and deducted
that amount from what C owed A,
giving A his note for the balance.
Two of the three judges held that
as no new consideration passed
from A to C for A's promise to pay
B, this was a collateral promise t6
pay the debt of another without
consideration, and, therefore, void
under the statute. This seems hard
to reconcile with the views ex-

28
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pressed in Barringer v. Warden,
sutpra, and Barker v. Bucklin,
sufira.
The dissenting opinion was that
C's promise was founded on his
existing indebtedness to A for work
done, and the consideration for the
promise was that $87 should be deducted from that debt to A, and his
note made out for the balance.
:rhis practically amounts to saying
that A's promise was an original
distinct agreement to pay his own
debt for a good consideration, and,
therefore, was not within the
Statute of Frauds. The latter view
seems to be more in accord with the
weight of authority.
Various examples of what the
courts have declared to be valid
considerations may be found in the
following table, taken from Robins
v. Gilman, 43 N. H., 485: "Cases
where the promise has been held
binding without writing: (I) where
the debtor has put into the hands
of the promisor the amount of his
debt: Hilton v. Dinsmore, 21 Me.,
413; Lawrence v. Fox 2o N. Y.,
6 Smith, 268; Blunt v. Boyd, 3
Barb., 209; (2) or transferred to
him property equivalent: Skelton
v. Brewster, 8 Johns., 376; Gold v.
Philips, io Johns., 412; Farley v.
Cleveland, 4 Cow., 432; S. C., 9
Cow., 639; Flwood v. Monk, 5
Wend., 235; Barker v. Bucklin, 2
Denio, 45 ; Pike v. Brown, 7 Cush.,
136; Alger v. Scoville, i Gray, 396;
Preble v. Baldwin, 6 Cush., 552;
Todd v. Tobey, 29 Me., 224; Dearborn, v. Parks, 5 Me., 83; Bird v.
Gammon, 3 Bing. (N. C.), 883;
Wait v. Wait, 28 Vt., 350; Olinstead v. Greely, iS Johns:, 2;
Meech v. Smith, 7 Wendell, 317;
Gardner v. Hopkins, 5 Wend., 23;
King v. Despard, 5 id., 277; (4)
or where the promisee has trans-

OF

FRAUDS.

ferred or released to the promisor
some interest in the property of the
debtor, as a lien given by law to a
landlord upon the goods of his
tenant for rent: Slingerland v.
Morse, 7 Johns., 463; or of a
bailee for services: Mallory v. Gillet, 7 Smith, 412 ; (5)or where the
promisee has released to the promisor and holder of the property
an attachment: Cross v. Richardson, 30 Vt., 642; (6) or where he
has released to the promisor the
right to attach the property of the
debtor: Sampson v. Hobart, 28 Vt.,
697; or where he has agreed to
allow time to the debtor: Smith v,.
Ives, 15 Wend., 182; Watson v,.
Randall, 20 id., 201; or has discharged a suit against him: Rowe
v.Whittier, 21 Me., 545."
The subsisting liability of the
third person has sometimes become
an important feature in the decision
of a case.
Sternburg v. Callanan, 14 Iowa,
251 (i861). Awas doing business
in his own name, and was indebted
to the plaintiff. B and C entered
into a partnership with A, the new
firm assuming a large amount of
A's indebtedness. A was soon after
discovered to be insolvent and
shortly retired from the firm, his
original debt to the plaintiff remaining still unpaid. Plaintift sued
on a verbal promise made to him
by C, that the new firm would pay
off A's indebtedness. Judgment
for plaintiff. Appealed. Reversed.
"It is well replied by defendants
that this promise, not being in
writing, was void under the Statute
of Frauds, and upon this ground
the plaintiff could not recover. A
promise to pay the debt of another,
he still remaining liable, is a collateral promise and void. A promise to pay the debt of another for
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-which, afterthe promise, the other
still remains liable, is within the
Statute of Frauds, and must be in
writing, or it is void. Under our
statute no evidence of a contract is
admissible, wherein one person
promises to answer for the debt of
another, unless such contract be in
writing and signed by the party
charged, or his agent But nothing
in this provision shall prevent the
party against whom the unwritten
contract is sought to be enforced
from being called as a witness by
the opposite party, norhis oral testimony from being evidence. The
plaintiff did not offer to bring this
case within the exception by the
introduction of the opposite party.
If, therefore, C was authorized to
act for the new firm, the contract
sought to be enforced was within
the Statute of Frauds, and the evidence tending to prove the parole
promise should have been excluded."
Jackson v. Raymor, 12 Johns.,
291 (1815). Payee of a promissory
note was about to serve warrant on
the maker upon default in payment, when the father of the maker
informed him that "he would pay
the debt, as he had taken his son's
property, and meant to pay his
honest debts." Payee then sued
the father on this verbal promise.
The Court said that the father was
to be considered trustee for his son's
creditor's, for he had received an
assignment of his son's property in
trust for the payment of his son's
debts. "But, the originaldebt of
the son was still subsisting; and,
according to the decision in the
case of Simpson and Patten (4
Johns. Rep., 422), and the authorities there cited, it seems well settled
that a promise to pay the debt of a
third person must be in writing,
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notwithstanding it is made on a
sufficient consideration."
Judgment.for defendant below. Apparently the Court was of the opinion
that the trusteeship of the father
amounted to a consideration forhis
promise.
The language of this case seems
to furnish authority for the principle that a promise in writing to pay
the debt of a third person, and on
a sufficient consideration, is void
under the statute if the original
debt still exists.
This view has been criticised in
later cases (see Farley v. Cleveland,
4 Cow., 432 (post), and cases cited;
Allen v. Thompson, io N. H., 32).
Furthermore, the court seems to
have unnecessarily gone out of its
way to arrive at the conclusion
that the promise was void on tl~e
ground of the continuing liability
of the original debtor; it might
have simply declared that here was
a promise to pay the debt of a third
person, not in writing, and that the
trusteeship was not a consideration;
for the father had not contracted a
debt by becoming the assignee of
his son's property for the benefit of
creditors, nor did he himself receive any benefit or advantage by
way of consideration: Barker v.
Bucklin, 2 Denio, 58.
Farley v. Cleveland, 4 Cow., 432
(1825).
A owed B on a note. C
promised by parol to pay B, in consideration that A delivered to him
(C) hay to the value of the debt.
Held, not within the statute. "In
all these cases founded upon a new
and original consideration of benefit to the defendant, or harm to
the plaintiff moving to the party
making the promise, either from
the plaintiff or the original debtor,
the subsisting liabilityof the original debtor is no objection to the

NOVATION-STATUTE
recovery." On this point the court
seems to differ from the opinions
expressed in Simpson v. Patten, 4
Johns., 422; Jackson v. Rayner, 12
Johns., 291; but accords with the
rulings in Skelton v. Brewster, 8
Johns., 376; Gold & Sill v. Phillips,
io Johns., 412; Maule v. Buckwell,
50 Pa., 39."
Leonard v.Vredenburgh, 8 Johns.,
29 (i81). One of the often-quoted
cases on this subject is an early New
York decision. A drew a promissory note in favor of B for the value
of goods delivered to A from B.
At the same time C went security,
writing on the note, "I guaranty
the above." The Court held : "It
was all one original and entire
transaction, and the sale and delivery of the goods to A, supported the
promise of C as well as the promise
c f A. If the contract between A
and B had been executed and perfectly past before C was applied to,
so that his promise could not connect itself with the original communication, then the case would
have been very different, and the
undertaking of C would have required a distinct consideration. A
mere naked promise to pay the already existing debt of another without any consideration, is void. But
in the present case the promise was
made at the time of the original
negotiation between A and B. It
was incorporated with that contract, and became an essential
branch of it. The whole was one
single bargain, and the want of consideration as between C and A cannot be alleged. "If there was a
consideration for the entire agreement (and A's note purporting to be
given for value received was evidence of it) that consideration was
the alimentforthe defendant'spromise. . . . A's note given for value
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received, and of course importing a
consideration on its face, was all the
consideration requisite to be shown.
The paper disclosed that C guaranteed this debt of A's; and if it was
all one transaction the value received was evidence of a consideration embracing both promises."
The promise is, therefore, not
within the Statute of Frauds. This
case is much criticised, and severely so in Maule v. Buckwell, 50
Pa., 52. "It is not true, as a general rule, that the promise to pay
the debt of another is not within
the Statute if it rests upon a new
consideration passing from the
promisee to the promisor. A new
consideration for a new promise is
indispensable without the Statute,
and if a new consideration is all
that is needed to give validity to a
promise to pay the debt of another,
the Statute amounts to nothing.
Nor can it make any difference
that the new consideration moves
from the promisee to the promisor.
...
. There (Leonard v. Vredenburgh) it was laid down that
cases are not within the Statute
where the promise to pay the debt
of another arises out of some new
and original benefit or harmi moving between the new contracting
parties." That this proposition is
inaccurate, however, is almost universally admitted, and, as we have
already remarked, it practically
denies all effect to the Statute. It
cannot be admitted for a moment
in the terms in which it was expressed: Approved in Townsend
v. Long, 77 Pa., 148. (See, also,
Dunn v. West, 5 B. Mon., 381 ; Lucas v. Chamberlain, 8 B. Mon.,
276.)
The preceding cases, when placed
side by side, reveal the diversity of
methods adopted by the courts for
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the determination of what is at
first sight a simple question. To
select one test that would answer
equally well on all occasions seems
to be of doubtful possibility, for all
that have yet been tried are open to
some objection.
The courts frequently choose the
easier plan of picking out a salient
feature of the case, such as the
subsisting liability of the "third
person," and base their decision on
this comparatively narrow ground
without touching upon the broader
and more debatable ground of the
consideration and nature of the
promise. While this course may
be satisfactory enough in certain
individual cases, it doesnotadvance
our knowledge of the underlying
principles, for the reason that it
does notpenetrate to the foundation
from which every one of these
cases springs, namely, the promise
itself.
As a test, the subsisting liability
of the third person must often fail,
for it frequently happens that, while
the third person continues liable,
the ulterior personal benefit or
advantage to the promisor, derived
from his promise, is tenfold greater
than the amount of that third person's liability; and common sense
would show that such a promisor
was not paying another's debt, but
assuming a personal obligation of
his own to his very great advantage.
The consideration for the promise,
on the other hand, has more advantages: it is an important feature
where it consists of money transferred to the promisor with the
understanding that the debt is to be
paid out of that fund alone. The
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objections to it as a basis of decision"
are; that it forces a line to be drawn
as to just how much is necessary to
constitute a consideration, thus
leaving room for close and doubtful
decisions, which will, in time, perplex rather than clarify the question. When the discussion is confined to the form or matter of the
actual consideration which has
passed, it is inevitable that cases
should become narrowed down to
fine distinctions, from which differ-.
ences of opinion will not unnaturally arise.
It seeris that the test which may
be satisfactorily applied to the
majority of cases is the nature and
purpose of the promise itself. The
various elements for consideration
in this connection are the intent
and object of the promisor in
making the promise, the resui
to himself and the other parties
to the transaction, the inducement
he had to ihake it, the attendant,
outlying, or prospective advantages that he has thereby obtained,
or that he expected to obtain
at the time he made it, it being
immaterial whether they formed
part of the actual consideration he
received or not. It is plain that
the nature of the consideration
cannot affect the terms of the
promise itself. The foundation on
which the transaction is based is
the promise; to examine all the
circumstances which throw light on
its purpose and character would
seem to be the most natural aiid
effective method of determining
whether the promisor was paying
his own debt or another's.
0. B. JUDSON.-

